





The field of animal ethics has recently taken a political turn, by which I mean 
that many philosophers interested in ethical questions about our treatment of non-
human animals (hereafter referred to as “animals”) have turned their attention to the 
issue of what the state owes to animals.  A great deal of this work has been focused on 
the question of which, if any, obligations of justice the state has to animals.  In fact, 
three of the most prominent instigators of the political turn—Nussbaum1, Cochrane2 
and Garner3—have focused their attention mainly on establishing that the state does 
indeed have such obligations and identifying their content.  
Notice, however, that there are other, likewise very important, questions vis á 
vis the state’s relation to animals that would remain open even having resolved the 
obligations-of-justice question.  We can see this most easily by simply taking note of 
the consensus among liberals (to whom this essay is addressed) that much of what the 
state is morally obligated to do—or at least consider doing, taking into account 
relevant costs and other drawbacks—for humans has nothing to do with securing 
justice: e.g. setting aside wild areas for recreational purposes, providing funding for 
the arts, establishing national holidays, etc.4 
 The state’s obligation to do these things is based on nothing other than that 
doing so promotes our welfare.  Promoting our welfare is one of the state’s basic 
obligations.5  
This invites the question: Does the state have that same obligation with respect 
to animals?  Call this the Animal Welfare Question (AWQ).  Note that there is 
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nothing preventing us from endorsing the Nussbaum/Cochrane/Garner claim that the 
state has obligations of justice to animals while denying that the state is obligated to 
promote the welfare of animals; answering the question of justice doesn’t amount to 
answering the AWQ.6 To appreciate this point, consider the case of a foreign national 
(a human one).  Even cosmopolitans, who argue that states have extensive obligations 
of justice to foreign nationals, don’t hold that the state is obligated to promote their 
welfare (except insofar as promoting their welfare is part of what justice demands).  
Similarly, if the state has obligations of justice to the animals within its borders, this 
might require it to do a fair bit by way of promoting their welfare,7 but it would 
remain an open question whether the state could be obligated to φ simply because φ-
ing would promote the welfare of some animals within its borders.  This is a more 
precise version—and my official version—of the AWQ. 
 I contend that contractarianism can give us a principled answer to the AWQ, 
and in this paper I will make that contention the centerpiece of an argument for 
contractarianism.  The irony, or if not irony then at least unexpectedness, of making 
this argumentative move is not lost on me.  For historically contractarianism, 
especially Rawls’s version of it, has taken significant heat for implying that the state 
has few if any obligations to animals.8  
The possibility of contractarianism having this flaw is a serious matter, but 
nevertheless my agenda here is to play offense as opposed to defense.9 My strategy is 
to show that contractarianism has an advantage in that it can give a principled answer 
to the AWQ while many of its competitors cannot.  Contractarianism actually does 
give a principled answer to the AWQ, I will show, when it is formulated as 
teleological, where to be teleological is to attribute a purpose to the state.10 I contend 
that all and only teleological theories, of which I admit contractarianism is but one 
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version, can give a principled answer to the AWQ.  And I will argue that since 
contractarianism’s brand of political teleology is the only metaphysically acceptable 
kind, we should adopt contractarianism from among the class of teleological theories.  
My thesis, then, is that contractarianism is pro tanto superior to other teleological 
theories on metaphysical grounds and pro tanto superior to non-teleological theories 
in its ability to give a principled answer to the AWQ. 
I begin by arguing, in §2, that we have not yet been presented with a 
principled answer to the AWQ that doesn’t appeal to the purpose of the state.  This of 
course doesn’t demonstrate that this feat cannot be pulled off; perhaps more effective 
non-teleological theories are yet to come.  Rather, it serves the purpose of tilting the 
balance of considerations in favor of teleological approaches if they can succeed 
where non-teleological approaches haven’t.  Then, in §3, I show that they can indeed 
manage this, quite easily, and I argue that among teleological theories 
contractarianism is the only acceptable one that’s been formulated.  §4 concludes. 
By way of warning, this is an essay in political philosophy, and if it qualifies 
in addition as an essay about animals it does so only obliquely.  Crucially, this essay 
closes without ever defending an answer to the AWQ.  This is not because of any lack 
of concern on my part as to what the correct answer to that question is.  Just the 
opposite, in fact.  It is because I consider that question so fundamentally important 
that I’ve arrived at the idea of arguing for contractarianism on the grounds that it, and 
it alone, can give a principled answer to it without succumbing to metaphysical 
objections.  Unfortunately, giving a thorough argument for a particular answer the 
AWQ would require a whole essay on its own, so I cannot make my argument for 
contractarianism and answer the AWQ in this single piece of work.11 This may be just 
as well, however.  Because I take no stand here as to how contractarianism, in its most 
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plausible form, answers the AWQ, it is reasonable to hope that my argument for 
contractarianism will be assessed on its own merits since the reader’s judgment of it 
cannot be prejudiced by her knowing my ultimate agenda vis á vis the relation 
between animals and the state.  Of course, the drawback of this approach is that it 
fails to illuminate as to whether the best version of contractarianism can give a 
plausible answer to the AWQ, which is a shame since this is an important factor in 
settling whether we should accept contractarianism.  But I insist that whether 
contractarianism can even give a principled answer at all—whatever its content—is 
also an important (and independent) determinant of whether we should accept it.  Of 
course that depends on showing that the ability to do so without succumbing to 
metaphysical objections makes it unique among all political theories, which I do 
intend to show.  
 
2. Non-Teleological Approaches to the AWQ 
 
In this section I examine the options at our disposal for answering the AWQ in a 
principled way without recourse to a claim about the purpose of the state.  I begin in 
§2.1 by assessing whether an appeal to the facts about animals’ moral status can do 
the trick.  I then devote the rest of §2 to determining whether any subfield of political 
theory provides tools for getting the job done, focusing initially (§2.2) on citizenship 
theory before concluding (§2.3) by looking at democratic theory.  In all three cases I 
will conclude that we are left without a route to a principled answer to the AWQ.   
 
2.1 The Appeal to Moral Status 
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Perhaps the most straightforward way to approach the AWQ is to appeal to the 
facts whatever they are, as to whether (and if so, how much) moral status animals 
have.  One often sees, in the literature on animal ethics, casual inferences (usually 
implicit) of the sort: animals do [not] have (a certain amount of) moral status and 
therefore the state is [not] obligated to φ with respect to them.12  
The problem with this inference is that there is a great deal of morality that 
floats free, more or less, from the facts about moral status and if this is true in moral 
theory than it may well be true in political theory as well.  In moral theory, it’s 
sensible to think that while our universal obligations—our obligations not to lie, kill, 
cheat, steal, etc.—extend to all individuals with moral status, our special obligations 
do not.  So, for instance, I have obligations of love and nurture (if I’m a parent) only 
to my children, I have fiduciary obligations (if I’m an attorney) only to my clients, 
and I have promissory obligations only to those to whom I’ve made promises.  
Similarly, there’s appeal to the idea that some of the state’s obligations, such as the 
obligation not to kill, extend to everyone with moral status (this would explain why 
the obligation on the part of the state to not launch wars of aggression is an obligation 
it has to everyone), while others of its obligations extend to only some individuals.  
And maybe the obligation to promote welfare is among that latter set of obligations.  
Those who take the nationalist side of the nationalism/cosmopolitanism debate 
certainly believe that the state’s obligation to promote welfare is limited to those 
humans to whom it bears a special relationship.  Of course, the nationalists might be 
wrong, but if they’re wrong it’s not simply because the humans to whom the state 
does not bear a special relationship have (a certain amount of) moral status.  
Cosmopolitans, when arguing for their view, don’t simply establish that all humans 
have (a certain amount of) moral status and leave it at that.  Rather, what both the 
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cosmopolitans and the nationalists do is construct and appeal to a theory of the state’s 
obligations. 
What I’m proposing, then, is that just as it takes political theory to settle the 
question of whether the state has welfare-promotion obligations to the humans outside 
its borders, likewise it will take a political theory to answer the question whether the 
state has welfare-promotion obligations to the animals within its borders.  This is why 
the appeal to moral status doesn’t work as a way of answering the AWQ.  For this 
reason, I devote the rest of §2 to examining two subfields of political theory with an 
eye toward determining whether they contain within them the grounds of a principled 
answer to the AWQ. 
 
2.2 The Appeal to Citizenship Theory 
Donaldson and Kymlicka devote chapters 3-5 of their book, Zoopolis,13 to an 
argument for domesticated animal citizenship.  The claim that they devote most of 
those three chapters to defending and on which they base their argument for 
domesticated animal citizenship is:  
If domesticated animals have a right that their interests count equally in 
determining the direction of the country then domesticated animals should be 
granted citizenship.   
The reason Donaldson and Kymlicka devote nearly all their effort to defending this 
conditions is that they are worried that the idea of domesticated animal citizenship 
will strike the reader as preposterous.  Note, however, that in order for Donaldson and 
Kymlicka to get anywhere by defending this conditional they need its antecedent to be 
true.  And its antecedent cannot simply be assumed; in fact it constitutes an answer to 
the AWQ that many political theorists are likely to reject.  Unfortunately, their 
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defense of the antecedent is remarkably brief.  All they say in its support is that we 
have “brought [domesticated animals] into our society, and deprived them of other 
possible forms of existence (at least for the foreseeable future)”.14  So the moral 
premise in their argument is 
1. if we have brought an individual into our society and deprived 
him/her of other forms of existence (at least for the foreseeable 
future) then that individual (if s/he is domesticated) has a right that 
his/her interests help to determine the state’s direction, 
and their empirical premise is 
2. we have brought domesticated animals into our society and deprived 
them of other forms of existence (at least for the foreseeable future), 
and their conclusion is 
3. domesticated animals have a right that their interests help to 
determine the state’s direction. 
Surprising as it may seem, that’s pretty much it.  The only thing Donaldson and 
Kymlicka have to add is an argument-by-analogy in favor of premise 1; specifically, 
they say that the case of human slaves shows that premise to be true.  (For the reader 
who is skeptical that that could be the entirety of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
argument, see their own summary of their argument.15 
 Premise 2 merits a close look, so we’ll begin there.  What do Donaldson and 
Kymlicka mean when they say that an individual is “in our society” and has no choice 
but to live out her life in it?  We can hone in on an answer by examining what they 
say about the Amish religious community in the United States.  Donaldson and 
Kymlicka describe them as opting out, or at least trying to opt out, of United States 
citizenship.  Now this is not equivalent to saying that the Amish aren’t “in American 
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society” in the relevant sense—i.e. that a version of premise 2 concerning the Amish 
would be false—but surely Donaldson and Kymlicka are committed to saying just 
that, for two reasons.  First, they come close to actually saying it when they say that 
the Amish are an example of a people who cannot or will not assent to the “social 
ethos of participation, cooperation, and affiliation”.16  Second, they say that it is not 
inherently unfair for groups like the Amish to lack citizenship status.17  Given 
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s further claim that citizenship is for all and only those who 
have “membership in a particular political community”18 they are committed to 
saying that the Amish aren’t members of the American political community.  This 
isn’t equivalent to saying that the Amish aren’t part of American society, but it is at 
least close—more on this connection later. 
 What does the point for which I have been arguing—that Donaldson and 
Kymlicka are committed to saying that the Amish are not part of American society—
imply for premise 2?  Well if the Amish, who after all speak the same language as, 
engage in commerce with, and recognize the authority of most of the same laws as 
other Americans aren’t a part of American society, it seems awfully suspect to 
propose a blanket categorization of domesticated animals in the United States as part 
of American society.  Could the Amish person’s horse be a member of American 
society while the person is not? 
 Of course, Donaldson and Kymlicka could make an exception for the 
domesticated animals that belong to members of isolationist communities such as the 
Amish, but that wouldn’t solve the problem.  For we could then ask them to point out 
a relevant difference between the situation of the Amish person’s horse and the horse 
that belongs to an integrated member of American society.  Surely this would be a 
challenge, as for both horses their life is for the most part whatever life their owner 
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creates for them.  Whether they have a life of hard work or leisure, whether they are 
given opportunities to form bonds with humans and other horses—these matters are 
determined by the their owner.  Now this is not to say that the life of a horse isn’t to 
some extent subject to broader societal forces.  Being cut off from or integrated into 
society is a matter of degree, and even Amish people are somewhat integrated into 
broader American society, as mentioned earlier.  However, to whatever extent the 
world of the Amish is the world they make for themselves, it is true to an even greater 
extent that the world of a domesticated animal is the world its owner makes for it.  So 
since Donaldson and Kymlicka are committed to rejecting as mostly false a version of 
premise 2 concerning the Amish they must surely reject the original premise 2 as 
mostly false as well. 
Having said this much, I now want to move on to critiquing premise 1, which 
is the more important task as regards AWQ.  I contend that we should be skeptical of 
premise 1 because the connection between society and the state is not at all 
straightforward.19 Premise 1 seems to assume a tight connection, otherwise it would 
make no sense to say that membership in society grounds a right against the state that 
it allow one’s interests to determine the state’s direction.  Now we could make 
premise 1 true by using the idea of the state to define society—e.g. by saying that 
society is that set of individuals in which the state’s sovereignty resides—but then 
premise 1 would emerge as totally unhelpful.  We can all agree that the state should 
advance the interests of all those that constitute its sovereign, but we will then need 
some guidance as to how to identify which individuals constitute the sovereign.  If we 
instead look for an independent definition of society, we’ll be in trouble for an 
entirely different reason, which is that “society” is a notoriously amorphous concept 
and consequently there are several reasonable conceptions of it.  Donaldson and 
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Kymlicka themselves seem torn; they implicitly appeal to a narrower one in their 
discussion of the Amish and then a broader one in their discussion of domesticated 
animals, which is what causes the just-discussed problems for premise 2.  In any 
event, we need to know what conception of society is the politically relevant one—
that is, we need to know on which conception of society it is reasonable to say that 
being in society entitles one to have one’s interests help to determine the direction of 
the country.  That’s a question in political theory, but one with which Donaldson and 
Kymlicka do not engage.  So although Zoopolis doesn’t make the mistake of trying to 
answer the AWQ without appealing to political theory, its appeal to political theory 
doesn’t go deep enough to do the trick.20 
 
2.3  The Appeal to Democratic Theory  
 If the appeal to citizenship theory—at least the instance of it found in 
Zoopolis—cannot ground a principled answer to the AWQ,21 is there any other 
subfield within political theory that can?  I’m not aware of any others having been 
appealed to, but to me there is an obvious candidate.  This is because while there is no 
recognized branch of political theory devoted to answering the question of whose 
welfare the state is obligated to promote, there is a branch that has a closely related 
task: democratic theory.  Among the tasks of democratic theory, it is generally agreed, 
is determining which individuals should be given the right to participate in democratic 
decision-making.  Goodin calls this the problem of “constituting the demos”.22  And 
one might think that once we’ve determined the composition of the demos we ipso 
facto have an answer to the AWQ.   
This, however, is not the case.  It is reasonable to think that being in a position 
to have one’s interests set back by the state is a sufficient condition for an entitlement 
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to participate in its democratic decision-making.  (Goodin accepts this case.23)  Of 
course, many more individuals meet this criterion than meet the criterion of being 
among those whose welfare the state is obligated to promote; in particular, many 
foreign nationals will met the former criterion but (it is generally agreed) none of 
them meet the latter except insofar as some amount of welfare-promotion is a 
requirement of justice.  I’m not saying that this criterion for the constitution of the 
demos is valid; rather, I’m pointing out that its reasonableness shows us that 
answering the question of the correct constitution of the demos is not the same task as 
determining which individuals are such that the state ought to promote their welfare, 
since it is an open question whether there are sufficient grounds for an entitlement to 
inclusion in the demos besides being such that the state ought to promote one’s 
welfare. 
I do maintain, however, that there is a branch of political theory to which we can 
turn for an answer to the AWQ.  The branch I have in mind is teleology—the branch 
of political theory devoted to determining what the state’s purpose is.  I turn now to 
explaining how political teleology can help us to discover the answer to the AWQ. 
 
3. The Appeal to Political Teleology 
 
We have seen that with respect to any given state, it might be the case that among 
those who possess moral status and/or are objects of duties of justice only some of 
them bear the right sort of special relationship to that state such that it is obligated to 
promote their welfare.  Teleological political theories have an obvious way of 
capturing the idea that some individuals bear a special relation to the state and others 
don’t: they can say that some individuals are such that the state has as its purpose 
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serving their ends and others aren’t.  My goal in this section is to put meat on the 
bones of this thought. 
I begin by describing how contractarianism can give a principled answer to the 
AWQ.  Next, I identify the brand of teleology present in that kind of theory and argue 
that it is metaphysically innocuous in a way that other political teleologies are not.  
Finally, I defend that brand of teleology against objections. 
 
3.1 Contractarianism and the AWQ 
 Contractarian theories, as I define that class, begin with a state of nature 
thought experiment.24 The state of nature is just life in the absence of a state.  Often, 
as with Hobbes and Locke, this includes a description of the beings that live in this 
condition and what their lives are like.  But even in the absence of such details, we are 
dealing with a state of nature thought experiment so long as we are invited to answer 
the question of whether and how a group of individuals would take action so as to 
avoid living in this condition.   
The other classic element of a contractarian political theory is, of course, 
contracting.  Contracting is the means by which, purportedly, the rational beings 
avoid the state of nature; it is the contractarian’s proposed answer to the question that 
the state of nature thought experiment poses. 
 When some entity is created intentionally, that thing has as its purpose 
whatever its creators designed it to do.  Now here’s the key teleological inference that 
can be made: given that contracting is intentional (a safe assumption—it’s too 
complicated to be done by accident), the thing created through this particular instance 
of contracting—the state—has as its purpose doing whichever thing(s) its creators 
design it to do.25 Of course the contractors might have designed the state to be able to 
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do many things, so the contractarian should allow that the state might have many 
purposes, but for ease of expression I will continue to refer to ‘the purpose’ of the 
state.26 
 How does contractarianism, understood as including this sort of inference, 
propose to answer the AWQ?  (I will not discuss in this essay the versions of 
contractarianism that don’t make this inference.27 So when I refer to 
‘contractarianism’, I mean teleological contractarianism.) In the next sub-section I 
survey versions of contractarianism to illustrate how they can answer the AWQ in a 
principled way.  (That is all I want to establish; the question of which answer is more 
defensible is not my concern here.) 
 
3.1.1 Examples 
In determining the purposes of the contractors, any contractarian theory will 
say something about their basic motivational outlook.  At the broadest level there are 
three ways to describe it. 
The first possibility is that the contractors are depicted as giving greatest 
priority to seeing that right be done, as in Christine Korsgaard’s recent Kantian 
contractarianism.28 In this case the contractarian will depict the contractors as creating 
a contract oriented to the concerns of all the different kinds of beings that matter 
morally, which according to Korsgaard includes some animals.  Next comes the 
teleological inference to the claim that all the beings that matter morally are part of 
the state’s purpose, and finally a further inference to the claim that the state is 
obligated to promote the welfare all the individuals that matter morally.  This then 
serves as an answer to the AWQ.  (This answer is, I think, the thesis of Korsgaard’s 
paper, though she doesn’t express it this way.) 
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Second, the contractors can be depicted as not being motivated at all by moral 
concerns, but also as not being purely self-interested.  Such versions of 
contractarianism will characterize the contractors as being driven by something other 
than morality (sympathy, perhaps) to advance the cause of some individuals but not 
others.  Andrew Cohen, for instance, begins with the idea that parents will be 
concerned to protect the interests of their children, and from this starting point moves 
to the bolder claim that some of the contractors may well be moved to protect the 
interests of certain animals.29 From this premise the contractarian can make a 
teleological inference to the claim that the state’s purpose, among other things, is to 
protect the interests of children and certain animals.  And such a contractarian will 
say, in partial answer to the AWQ, that the state is obligated to promote the welfare of 
children and some animals.  
The third possibility is that the contractors are depicted as purely self-
interested, in which case things are more complicated because there is the further 
question of how the contractors think about the self in which they are interested.   
At one extreme we might conceive of the contractors as being situated behind 
an extremely thick veil of ignorance, in which case they will have a correspondingly 
thin conception of the self whose good they are motivated to promote.  And the 
thinner the conception of the self, the larger the group of individuals who will fit that 
conception.  Mark Rowlands proposes, for instance, that the veil of ignorance should 
exclude knowledge of species membership, in which case the contractors will agree to 
a contract that protects all the kinds of species that the contractors could worry that 
they might be members of, namely all and only the kinds of being that are sentient.30 
That being the case the contractors will design the contract so as to protect all and 
only sentient beings, and from this premise the contractarian will infer that the state 
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has the purpose of protecting all and only sentient beings.  And from there it’s a short 
step to saying in answer to the AWQ that the state is obligated to promote the welfare 
of all sentient animals.  
At the other extreme we might depict the purely self-interested contractors as 
being situated behind no veil of ignorance at all.  This allows them to have a full 
conception of their selves, and since no two individuals are identical and each 
contractor is purely self-interested the result we get is that the contractors share no 
ends at all.  From this the contractarian will conclude that the contract itself is not 
directed toward anyone’s good.  This, of course, raises the question of what its 
content will be.  One answer—and this is the answer given by Hobbes, who of course 
imposed no veil of ignorance on his contractors—is that the contract is nothing more 
than a coordinated set of rights-transfers from each individual to an artificial person, 
who thereby becomes the “sovereign”, which for our purposes can be thought of as 
equivalent to the state.  This being the case, the state has no positive political 
obligations.31 So the answer to the AWQ will be that the state is not obligated to 
anyone. 
I’ll end my survey here.  My purpose has been simply to give the reader a feel 
for how a contractarian can answer the AWQ in a principled way.  I trust that the 
examples already provided are sufficient to do the job. 
Before closing, however, I should say something about the inference that I 
represented all the various kinds of contractarian, except the Hobbesian kind, as 
making: the inference from the state having a certain purpose to its being obligated to 
promote that purpose.  This inference is not so obviously sound that it should be 
accepted without argument.  Unfortunately, making that argument would require a 
whole other essay.32 Roughly, however, the best argument would draw on two ideas: 
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1) that when an individual occupies a social role, s/he thereby acquires obligations-
qua-fulfiller-of-that-role; and 2) that the role-obligations attached to any social role 
are determined by the purpose of that role.  So, for instance, sitting on the board of 
directors of a corporation counts as occupying a social role—a role created for the 
purpose of ensuring that the goals of the corporation are met.  And each member of 
that board therefore has a role obligation to pursue the goals of the corporation.  The 
contractarian should say that things work roughly similarly with the state and those 
who occupy social roles within the state, such as legislators, judges and bureaucrats. 
 
3.2 The Metaphysics of Contractarianism 
 With these examples on the table, I want to turn our attention briefly once 
again to the general form of the teleological inference that contractarians make: 
because the creation of the contract, and with it the state, is intentional, the state has 
as its purpose doing whatever the contractors designed it to do.  This inference is not 
sui generis.  We unhesitatingly make similar inferences about other abstract entities 
created by humans.  For instance, we are happy to say that the purpose of a 
corporation is to do the things that its founders intended it to do.  And inferences of 
these two sorts are actually species of a broader genus that conforms to the following 
template: because X was intentionally created it has a purpose, and its purpose is to 
do the thing that its designers intend(ed) it to do.33 I’ll stipulate that any argument 
containing an inference of this sort is an instance of artifactual teleology.  
Contractarianism, therefore, is an instance of artifactual teleology.  It says that the 
state is an intentionally created thing—an artifact34,35—that its creators are the 
contractors, and its purpose is whatever the contractors design it to do.36 
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Artifactual teleology shouldn’t bother us any more in political theory than it 
does in everyday talk.  Consider, for instance, a stapler.  Unless we simply deny the 
existence of purposes, we’ll be happy to say that the purpose of a stapler is to bind 
together sheets of paper, and that the stapler obtained that purpose on account of the 
fact that that was what its creators designed it to do.  
So the metaphysics of artifactual teleology is entirely ordinary.  To be clear, 
however, I am not saying that particular versions of artifactual teleology in political 
theory are in any way ordinary.  The metaphysical commitments of artifactual 
teleology in political theory are entirely to do with its form, which is to say the kind 
of inference made, whereas any particular version of artifactual teleology in political 
theory is to be individuated by its premise (i.e., its state of nature story) and its 
conclusion (i.e. its claim as to what the purpose of the state is), and will inevitably be 
controversial.  But the fact that the metaphysics of artifactual teleology in political 
philosophy is uncontroversial is crucial, because it is a central tenet of political 
liberalism—which, for all I have said here, may be sound—that a political theory not 
be based on controversial metaphysical claims. Fortunately, since artifactual teleology 
is metaphysically ordinary everyone should be able to agree that the state is an artifact 
and is therefore apt for having a purpose endowed by its creators.  What reasonable 
people can disagree about, at least initially, is what that purpose is.  But that is a 
political disagreement.  
 
3.3 Is Contractarianism Really an Instance of Artifactual Teleology? 
In §3.2 I sorted contractarianism under the genus of artifactual teleology as a 
way of vindicating its metaphysics.  One might object, however, that I’m being too 
generous to contractarianism.  For some artifacts, such as a stapler, we can tell a story 
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about its creation that is both historically accurate and explains how it got its purpose.  
But the contractarian’s origin story for the state is, it might be argued, a myth.  So 
whereas the person who wants to be an artifactual teleologist about staplers is strictly 
bound by the facts in reasoning to her conclusion about what the purpose of a stapler 
is, the person who wants to be an artifactual teleologist about the state seems bound 
only by the limits of her imagination.  For our purposes, one important result of this 
leeway is that contractarians will disagree, as we saw in §3.1.1, as to the motivational 
profile of the contractors; they will also disagree, of course, about what the state of 
nature is like.  Since no such contracting ever occurred, it’s hard to imagine how one 
stipulation about the motivational profile of the contractors and the features of the 
state of nature could be right and all the others wrong.  And since these two variables 
play such a central role in any contractarian’s argument for a particular answer to the 
AWQ, it seems that the contractarian can game the system so as to support whichever 
answer she wants.37  Call this the arbitrariness objection. 
This is an extremely serious and important worry.  Notice, however, that the 
criticism arises insofar as one draws any substantive conclusions at all from the state 
of nature story.  As soon as the contractarian infers that X, Y, or Z is true of actual 
states from some feature of her state of nature story, she has to contend with the 
accusation that that story is a myth.  And all contractarians make inferences of this 
sort; Locke, for instance, inferred that actual states possess legitimacy only if they 
protect people’s natural rights to life, liberty and property.  The contractarian’s 
position doesn’t become any worse when she makes the teleological inference.  So, to 
use Locke as a case study once again, Locke’s position vis á vis the arbitrariness 
objection didn’t become worse when he made the further inference that the purpose of 
the state is to protect people’s natural rights to life, liberty and property. 
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In fact, there is a way in which the contractarian’s situation becomes better 
when she makes the teleological inference.  This is because doing so puts her in a 
good position to answer an objection that’s closely related to the arbitrariness 
objection—namely, the unnecessary detour objection.38  This objection begins by 
noting that the choice between various ways of construing the motivational profile of 
the contractors and other features of state of nature is obviously going to be made on 
moral grounds; for instance Locke’s stipulation that the contractors are concerned to 
protect natural rights to life, liberty and property was based on his belief that there 
actually are natural rights to life, liberty and property.  It goes on to ask why we can’t 
simply argue for political principles directly from those moral starting points instead 
of taking the convoluted route of asking how contractors would reason in a state of 
nature modeled to account for those moral convictions.  By way of response, the 
contractarian should admit that political principles can be established just as well 
without a state of nature thought experiment, but insist that the state’s purpose cannot.  
This is because telling an artifactual story about something’s purpose requires telling 
its origin story, which in the case of the state requires engaging in a state of nature 
thought experiment. 
Getting back to the arbitrariness objection, as I argued already it’s not the 
teleology of contractarianism that’s causing the problem here.  Therefore, I’m not 
going to respond to that objection here.39 As I said at the outset, my agenda is to play 
offense.  I want to show how the particular brand of teleology that is present in 
contractarianism gives it an advantage over other teleological theories and also how 
its being teleological gives it an advantage over non-teleological theories.  Other 
aspects of contractarianism that might constitute vulnerabilities (or strengths) are not 
my concern here. 
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3.4 Objections to Artifactual Teleology in Political Theory 
 If sorting contractarianism under the genus of artifactual teleology is a way of 
vindicating its metaphysics, the next question to ask is whether this categorization 
could also come with a cost—Are there any drawbacks to artifactual teleology in 
political theory? 
One obvious problem that has to be confronted when we deploy artifactual 
teleology in any normative field of inquiry is the problem of evil purposes.  I argued 
in §3.1 that there is a tight connection between the state’s purpose and the fact as to 
what obligations it has.  Well, what if the state’s purpose is evil?  Is it then obligated, 
and thus presumably permitted, to do evil? 
 This precise worry has been raised with respect to another kind of artifact—
the corporation.40 To my mind, Kenneth Goodpaster has offered a satisfactory 
response to this worry.41 He says, simply, that individuals who create a corporation 
cannot license it to do anything that they wouldn’t be morally permitted to do on their 
own.  Goodpaster, I take it, is not denying that a corporation can have an evil purpose.  
Rather, he is denying that the moral constraints on the corporation are determined 
entirely by its purpose.  He’s saying that in general the ordinary moral constraints that 
apply to flesh-and-blood people apply to corporations too. We should concede, I 
suggest, that the same is true of states.  Artifactual teleologists, who (by definition) 
want to extract at least some of their political theory from the facts as to the purpose 
of the state, should admit that some truths of political theory—namely, some facts 
about what the state is obligated to do—are simply instances of general moral facts 
about what all moral agents are obligated to do.42 (For instance, the state is bound by 
the general universal obligation not to kill.)  And they should concede, further, that 
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those moral facts are necessary truths and consequently set constraints on the 
contingent process whereby the state as artifact acquires its purpose and the 
corresponding obligations that follow from its having the purpose it does.   This 
would license artifactual teleologists to concede that there are certain things the state 
is not permitted to do no matter what its purpose qua artifact.43,44 
 A second problem for artifactual teleology in political theory is that it seems 
that artifacts can come to have purposes that their creators did not have in mind for 
them.  For instance, if I decide to use a t-shirt as a rag from now on, it seems that I’ve 
changed the purpose of that piece of cloth.  More troublingly, a human being is an 
artifact and therefore, according to artifactual teleology, the purpose of a human being 
is whatever purpose its parents had in mind for it in creating it, regardless of any 
purpose that that human might set for herself.  So, for instance, if a human were 
created for the sake of producing organs to transplant, then that human’s purpose 
would be to provide spare parts. 
 Artifactual teleology clearly requires revision in light of these problems.  
What we should say, I think, is that anything that has a self-given purpose cannot also 
have a creator-given purpose.  In other words, autonomy trumps artifactuality.  If an 
individual can set an end for herself, then that’s her end, period.45 And we should also 
allow that creator-given purposes can be trumped by new-user-given purposes, as 
when I repurpose a t-shirt as a rag.  
 Does this alter in any important way the doctrine of artifactual teleology in 
political theory?  It does.  Supposing that states are agents (as opposed to merely 
entities through which human agents exercise their agency), it’s not plausible to deny 
that they’re autonomous agents, since states have processes built in to them for 
engaging in reasoned deliberation about what to do.  Furthermore, given that states 
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are autonomous agents, states can give themselves purposes.  Any variety of 
artifactual teleology in political theory will have to account for this by explaining 
what happens after the state is established.  Contractarianism, for instance, has to 
entertain the possibility that the terms of the initial contract would eventually become 
so repugnant to the members of the state that they would come together to amend it.  
Having admitted for the sake of argument that states are autonomous it’s not open to 
me to say that the intentions of the original contractors settle in perpetuity the matter 
of what the state’s purpose is.46 What I have to say is that the intentions of the original 
contractors settle the matter of what the state’s purpose is only if the contract they 
create attracts perpetual assent.47 The contractarian then has a choice to make.  She 
can argue that her preferred contract would indeed attract perpetual assent; this would 
constitute an argument for what Rawls calls “stability”.  Alternatively, she can 
concede that her preferred contract would not attract perpetual assent and then 
undertake the task of developing a theory of how the original contract can be 
amended and renewed by subsequent generations.48 My suspicion is that the 
contractarian would do best to adopt to adopt a mixed strategy, arguing that there are 
certain inevitable features of our condition that can provide a rationale for perpetual 
assent to certain core elements of the original contract while conceding that changing 
circumstances provide a rationale for amending less central features of the contract. 
 
3.5 The Argument for Contractarianism as against Other Teleological Political 
Theories 
I’ve been arguing in this section that contractarianism is a version of 
artifactual teleology in political theory and that artifactual teleology in political theory 
is metaphysically ordinary and not vulnerable to damaging objections.  The final 
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piece of the puzzle is to argue that there is no other metaphysically acceptable version 
of teleology in political theory. 
To my knowledge there exactly two extant versions of teleology in political 
theory aside from artifactual teleology.  One is the idea that the state has the purpose 
that God gives it—an idea that we find in classic natural law theories.49 This version 
of teleology carries the metaphysical burden of presuming the existence of a very 
specific sort of deity.   
The other is the idea that the state has its purpose essentially, an idea we find 
in Plato and Aristotle.  They were quite clear on the claim that the purpose of the state 
is to promote eudemonia,50 but they never explained why that was the state’s purpose.  
This failure actually makes a lot of sense when taken within the context of the idea 
that a thing’s purpose, or telos in their parlance, is an essential feature of a thing and 
cannot itself be explained.51 The burden carried by this sort of teleology is, of course, 
its teleological essentialism.  It’s quite counterintuitive to suppose that it could ever 
be the case that a thing’s having a certain purpose is an unexplainable fact about it. 
Furthermore, if a thing’s having a certain purpose were an unexplainable fact about it, 
it’s hard to accept that that fact would have moral implications.  (Whereas, by 
contrast, if a thing has a purpose in virtue of its creators intentionally endowing it 
with one, there’s no mystery at all as to how this could have moral implications.  We 
already accept that rational individuals have moral powers; that is, powers to change 
the moral landscape, for instance by making promises.  Creating entities with 
purposes would simply be one more way to accomplish such changes.) 
 Perhaps there is some other kind of teleology in political theory that could be 
constructed.52 However, it is not clear that there are any unexplored options.53 
Consequently we can at the very least take what I’ve said here as a provisional 
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argument for artifactual teleology as against the other versions of teleology in 
political theory.  Furthermore, I’m going to treat the argument I’ve just made as an 
argument for contractarianism as against all other teleological political theories, even 
though strictly speaking it was an argument only for artifactual teleology in political 
theory.  This is not to suggest that contractarianism is the only possible version of 
artifactual teleology in political theory; it isn’t.  I said in §3.1 that contractarianism 
has two classic elements: the state of nature thought experiment and the idea of 
contracting as the way to avoid the state of nature.  All artifactual teleologists will 
agree with contractarianism that political theory must begin with state-of-nature 
theorizing.  This is because artifactual teleology in political theory begins, by 
definition, with the idea that the state is to be understood as being endowed by its 
creators with a purpose; this means that a plausible story about its creation has to be 
told, which in turn means that we have to understand why rational beings would 
consider its existence preferable to its absence.  This, in turn, requires engaging in a 
state of nature thought experiment.  But while all artifactual teleologists must agree 
that the state is endowed with a purpose through its creation, they might disagree over 
how the state is endowed with a purpose through its creation.54 And thus some 
artifactual teleologists might reject the second element of contractarianism—
contracting—and insert in its place some other theory about how the state of nature is 
purposefully avoided.  Hence the possibility of a non-contractarian version of 
artifactual teleology in political theory. 
Nevertheless, as far as I know the contracting story is the only such story 
that’s actually been told, which means that contractarianism is the only extant version 
of artifactual teleology in political theory.55 As to why, I can only speculate that 
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philosophers are convinced, correctly, in my judgment, that contracting is the only 
morally permissible way to avoid the state of nature.56 
*  *  * 
 I’ve argued in this section that contractarianism can answer the AWQ by 
giving a teleological explanation of the state’s having as its purpose serving the ends 
of some individuals and not others and inferring from the state’s having that purpose 
that it is obligated to serve the ends of some individuals but not others.  Before 
closing, I want to acknowledge that one might reasonably wonder why I’ve limited 
my argument for contractarianism to the claim that it can give a principled answer to 
the question of whether the state is obligated to promote the welfare of animals as 
opposed to the broader claim that contractarianism can give a principled answer to the 
question of whether the state is obligated to promote the welfare of X for any X.  This 
would certainly constitute a stronger mark in contractarianism’s favor, since there are 
other X’s besides animals whose political status is controversial.  We need to answer, 
for instance, the question whether the state is obligated to promote the welfare of 
human fetuses, and the question whether it’s obligated to promote the welfare of 
severely cognitively disabled humans.  If contractarianism gives us a way to develop, 
as I’ve said it does, a theory of to which individuals’ ends the state is to orient itself, 
then it appears that contractarianism can’t help but answer those questions too. 
 The reason I’ve limited my argument for contractarianism to its ability to give 
a principled answer to the AWQ is for lack of space.  The negative part of this 
essay—§2—would have had to be much longer if I hadn’t limited my ambitions this 
way.  For then I would have had to engage with other non-contractarian literatures on 
the political status of various kinds of individual, such as human fetuses and severely 
cognitively disabled humans, to demonstrate that those literatures haven’t yet 
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produced a principled answer to the question whether the state is obligated to promote 
the welfare of those kinds of being. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Two of the main points for which I’ve argued in this essay are that teleological 
political theories have the resources with which to ground a principled answer to the 
question of whether the state is obligated to promote the welfare of its animals and 
that no one from the non-teleological camp has shown how we can ground a 
principled answer without appealing to the purpose of the state.  I want to conclude by 
addressing the worry that I’m stirring up trouble where there need be none: one might 
doubt, after all, whether any heretofore anti-teleologist would care to resist the 
demand to attribute a purpose to the state.  
I want to say two things by way of response.  First, if the teleological camp 
within political theory, as I’ve described it, seems like a big tent, that’s because it is.  
What teleologists in political theory agree about is miniscule in comparison to what 
they disagree about.  Merely attributing the thinnest, most purely formal purpose to 
the state is still good enough to qualify one as an adherent of teleology in political 
theory.  
So there’s plenty of room for more theorists to join the teleological camp, and 
I’m happy to have the company.  However—and this is my second response—I 
suspect that many of those who might be tempted to cross over to my side won’t like 
the choice with which they’re confronted once they do.  The problem is that it’s not 
enough just to admit that the state has a purpose; one has to take a position on why the 
state’s purpose is what one proposes that it is.  Therefore, if one doesn’t want to 
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endorse contractarianism one is left in the position of needing to contrive some 
metaphysically acceptable story, aside from contractarianism’s artifactual story, about 
how a state can acquire a purpose.57 As I argued in §3.5, there doesn’t seem to be any 
such story to be told. 
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